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Draft Recommendation
on enlarged security: the security problems posed by the enlorgement of NATO
and the European institutions 
- 
conclusions drawn from the colloquy
The Assembll',
(t) Welcoming thc outcome of the parliamentarl' colloqul' held in Athens on the securitv problems
posed bv the enlargcment of NATO and the European instrtutrons.
(tt) Reaffrrmrng WEU's area of responsrbili[,for securitl'and defencc matters in pursuance of the
modrfied Brussels Trcaty.
(ttr) Considerrng that WEU must acquire the necessan'means to become mvolved rvhere'
(a) thts is necessary in order to deter aggression drrected at onc of rts member states;
@ rcquests for rts intervention are made by NATO, the United Natrons, the OSCE or the
European Union;
(c) Petersberg missrons require raprd intervention.
(t, Reiterating Decision 18, u'hrch it adopted rn Athens, and Recommendation 608 on the eastem
dimension of European secuntl',
(v) Supportrng any NATO enlargement that rvould enable stabilitl' and security to be effectn,ely
extended to central and eastern countrres rcsolved to plav an active part in such defence.
(v) Concerned nonetheless that such enlargement should not lead to any reduction in the obhgations
that derive from the Washrngton Treaty or contribute to x-eakening the Alhance's militarl, mcans or
perpetuatrng the present tmbalancc rn political mfluence and the drstrrbution of commands betrveen the
United States and the European members of NATO;
(vr) Stresstng at the same time the importance of creating a stronger Partnershrp for Peace rvrth a
vierv to extendrng stabrlrtl, and secunty to the entire continent of Europe.
(wu) Convtnced that the greater the part Europeans play mthin NATO, the more desirable the
operung of the latter rvrll be for all those who have an intercst in ensurmg that the European contrnent is
an area of peace and stability.
(O Considering that the European Unton is called to make a substantral contrrbutron to establishing
an order for peace, stabilitl'and prosperitv that rvrll strengthen solidarity among states across the entirc
continent of Europe;
(x) Stresstng in consequence the rmportance of the revision of the Maastncht Treatl' for European
Union enlargement;
(n) Consrdering that WEU rs called to plav an essential role in Europe's security;
(xii) Reaffirmrng that even though the terntorial rntegritv of WEU member countrics rs nowadavs no
longer directly threatened. an absolute requrrement of their secunty,is that the modrficd Brussels Treatv
remarns the basis of a European defence policy,
(xttt) Earnestlv desinng the European Uruon's common foreign and secuntv policy to succeed in
drau'ing Europeans together m concerted action to promote peace in Europe and throughout the world,
rvhile takrng the vteu' that the fact that certain countries urshing to pursue a pohcv of neutrality are
Europcan Uruon membcrs should not hinder or prevent decrsions berng made rn the framer,r'ork of WEU;
(nv) Au'are that WEU has a remtt to elaborate and rmplemcnt decrsions and actrons of the European
Uruon m thts sphere and considering that it rs therefore essential for the European Union and WEU to
contlnuc to drau' closer together;
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(xu) Convinced that such convergence implies that the European Union should m future accept as
new members onlv those countrres that are prepared to accede to the modrfied Brussels Treatl'.
(xvi) Fearing that the manner in nhrch NATO and the European Union will enlarge may' lead to the
creatron, albeit temporar-l'. of different secuntv zones;
(wu) Stressing therefore the rmportant rolc WEU can play rn extending and strengthening stabilrtl'
and secunty across central and eastern Europc,
(rvrt) Convinced therefore of the need for WEU to revrel its pohcy on enlargement whrle aiming to
ensure maximum convergence in the composrtion of the European Union, NATO and WEU;
(nx) Deepll' desirous that measures taken by NATO and the European Uruon to develop therr rela-
tions x'rth countnes that are not to become members, such as Russta or llkrame, should be supple-
mented by drarvrng up arrangements for cooperatlon betu'ecn those countnes and WEU;
(x9 Stressrng again the need to keep a close rvatch on polrtrcal developments rn Belarus, Moldova,
Albanra and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonra and at the same time pay attention to the
srtuation in Transcaucasta,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
1. Monitor closely thc NATO enlargcment process and its implicatrons for thc European mstrtu-
tions;
2. Take the necessary steps m readrness to negotiate the accession of nerv states to the modified
Brussels Treaty and accommodate them in WEU,
3. Assess the financial rmplicatrons of Atlantic Alhance enlargement for WEU member countries
and mform the Assembly accordingly;
4 Ensure that until such trme as all European Unron members are members of WEU, the latter
should remaln an autonomous organisation, and specrfically' that the Council should retain tts powcrs of
decisron and independent action and rts freedom to intervene on behalf of the United Nations or the
OSCE;
5. Enhance the European securitv and defence rdentity'(ESDI). w'hrch would meet with a greater
degree of approval from the public at large and rvhich mrght be useful, partrcularly rvhere humanitanan
interventron rs urgently requtred.
6. Invrte all European Uruon members to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty and encourage
them to join the Atlantic Alhance:
7 . Reassess rts enlargement pohcy on the basis of the prrnciple that rvhere a member countrl' of the
Atlantic Alliance and a candidate for membership of the European Union and the Atlantic Alhance that
is a member of the reinforced Partnershrp for Peace fulfil the conditrons for European Uruon entry, they
also have a case for becommg full members of our o\ n Orgarusatton, ensuring all the while that such
applications do not in any' rvay, impair the close cooperation and reciprocal transparencv that extst
between WEU and NATO;
8 Intensifi,cooperation between WEU and all rts associate partners, rn accordance with the criteria
defined in paragraph 4(b) of Recommendation 608, both by strengthening their involvement in the
Organisatron's activities and grvrng them a more promlnent role rn WEU operations, particularly
Petersberg-type missions ;
9. Strengthen cooperation with Russia and Ukraine in specific areas, partrcularly arms control veri-
ficatron procedures, humanitarian operations, the monitoring of natural drsasters and military transport.
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Exp lanatory Memor undu m
(submitted by Mr Urbain, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The collapse of the communist regimcs in
eastern Europe at thc end of the 1980s, the
reumficatron of Gcrman\,, the demise of the
Soviet Unron and the drssolution of the Warsarv
Pact have. not surpnslngly, radicallv altered the
politrcal and geostratcgrc map of Europe. The
nerv democracres of central and south-eastern
Europc lost no trme in voicing therr r,rrsh to
belong to these economlc and politico-military'
instrtutions of the West. in the belief that, on the
intemational front, membershrp uould guarantcc
therr emancipalon from Russra, uhrle at home, rt
rvould contrrbute to building stable. u'cstern-
stvle, economic and politrcal structures
2. This is the reason rvhy. to date, ten ccntral
and eastern European countries have apphcd to
3orn NATO, the European Uruon and Western
European Union. Although thc group of appli-
cants consists of countrres with a simrlar hrstory',
thel' are far from homogenous in terms of either
their economlc or therr political development.
Moreover. the fact that they rnclude among their
number some countrres to rvhose membership of
NATO structures Russra u'ould be rmplacably
opposed. rvhrle takrng a much softer line m other
cases, u'idcns the drfferences in their applications
still furthcr Furthermore, from the West's point
of vtew. rt rs vrrtualll' certain that accessron to
NATO wrll be by stages, rvhile European Union
and consequently WEU enlargement urll requrrc
a much longer period of negotiatron Logicalll,.
therefore, a situation mrght be envrsaged ovcr the
next ten years or so where some of the ten coun-
trres seeking to jorn Westem polrtico-mrlrtan'
structures would not be NATO mcmbers. others
u'ould not be members of the Europcan Uruon
and some mrght not even be members of erther.
Completing thrs prcture of Europe's short-term
future as one of change, charactcnsed b1, the
assimilation of groups of new member countries
by' stages mto western polrtico-mrlitary struc-
tures. rvill be a partnershrp, seemingly essential
to the new securitl' svstem in Europe. involving
the neutral countnes and countrres such as
Russia and Ukrarnc (and later Belarus) that do
not rvant or are unable to jorn $,cstcrn lnstltu-
trons. Equalll', there rvrll be a need to tn, and
think of \r,avs to strengthen thc secuntv of 1'et
other countries uhrch, for a varicty of reasons,
will also remaln on the srdclines of thrs tu.o or
rather three-rvay enlargcmcnt. for example the
successor states of former Yugoslavra or
Albanra
3. Strengthenrng secuntl' for all European
countrics u'hether members, non-members or
future members of European and Euro-Atlantic
polrtrco-mrlrtarl, organrsatrons rs no easv task.
Persevcrance, rmagmation and flexrbrlrtv are all
necessary in order to attam the desrred goal
Western European Union has, rn vour Rap-
porteur's vre\,, a role to play in thrs connectron
and must bc willing to accept the challengc
4 The colloquy organiscd b1, the WEU
Assembll, on l1 and 12 March dealt. rt u'as
generally' felt successfulll', u'ith thrs vast.
important and hrghll'toprcal politrcal rssue. The
large number of partrcipants, the splendid
contributions b1'the spcakcrs and the high level
of debate rvere \et another demonstration of the
extent to lvhrch central Europe's future securitv
and that of the lvhole of our continent arouses
urdesprcad mterest The present report attcmpts
to rccrcatc the atmosphere of the colloquy' and to
draw conclusrons, and at the same time to present
the oblective factors determmmg the eastu'ard
enlargement of u'estem mstitutrons and thc
implications for the future of peace on our contl-
nent and throughout the rnorld.
II. The ten applicant countries
(a) Poland
5. Poland, the largest and most populous
central European country. has becn a free market
economv for some vears now; rt rs also the fast-
est grourng in the rcgron (+ 7o/o rn 1996) This
rmpression of relatrvc strength rs underpirured b1'
actlve drplomacl' drrected prrncipalll' towards the
countn"s mcorporation rnto $'estern polrtico-
military systems, chrcfl1'NATO. Poland's for-
eign policy also has a strong regional emphasrs,
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and is charactensed b1' reahsm and matuntv and
a care to ensure that Russra and Ukrarne do not
become margrnalised from the nex- Euro-Atlantrc
securitv st'stem
6. Hence rn October 1996. rts Presrdent. Mr
Kr,r'asnieu'ski. addressrng the Roval Instrtute of
Internatronal Affarrs. drspelled anv notion that
nuclcar weapons mrght be deploved on Polish
ternton' and stressed that NATO enlargement
should be accompanred bv a charter goverrung
thc rclatronshrp bchveen the Atlantic Alliance
and Russra and bv a securltv agreement with
Ukrarnc In an address to thc WEU Assembly
some u'eeks later. the Polish leadcr rerterated hrs
countn"s asprrations to.lorn NATO 
- 
and West-
ern European Union 
- 
at the carhcst possrble
opportunitl,and also statcd that Poland $'ould m
an1' event press for Russra and Ukrarne to be part
of the nerv Europcan sccurrty sl'stcm
7. The creation of the lornt Pohsh-Lrthuanran
and Pohsh-Ukramian peacekeeping battahons.
the tripartite milrtary cooperatron agreement
Poland signed ii'ith Ukrarne and the Unrted
Krngdom and the creatron of an area of free trade
urth the Baltrc Sea states (agrecd rn Stockholm
rn Apnl 1996) are tlpical examples of the hrghly
actrvc and imagrnatrve regronal policv of a coun-
try uhrch rs a founder and still an active member
of the Vrsegrad Group
8 Poland's cfforts to restructure its armed
forccs. rvhrch have recently have been brought
undcr polrtrcal control to meet NATO criteria.
are undoubtcdll' bcrng madc easrer by'the drstinct
lmprovement m the countn"s cconom\,. Poland
norv feels readl'to shoulder thc financral burden
of integratron wrth Euro-Atlantrc structures (c f
the Polish Euro-Atlantrc Assocratron report
quoted bt'Reuters on 29 Januan' The text of
this report u,as presented b1' Mr Onvszkiervrcz.
former Defence Mmrster of Poland. at the Athens
colloqul'). The Polish Government moreover
hopes to be m a posrtron to proceed x'ith thc
ma.;or structural reforms required if Poland is to
galn entn'to the European Uruon 
- 
particularly
in vrew' of the might of the country"s agricultural
sector.
9 Poland has bcen an associate partner of
Western European Union since 1994. President
Ku'asrueu'skr, rccenth'l u'arned NATO against
the danger of making too manv concesslons to
Russia rvhen drawrng up a NATO/Russra Char-
ter If NATO rvas to undertake not to statron
nuclear weapons in the terrrton' of the ne\\' mem-
ber countries. it rvould be vrtal for the charter to
be concluded u'ith Russra to obhge the latter to
lvrthdrarv rts nuclear \\'eapons from thc
Kahningrad enclal'e President Krvasnieu'ski
also stressed that lt $'as very rmportant that
Ukrarne should lead an independent existence.
(b) Hungary
l0 Gencrally' consrdered to be among the first
group of countnes to bc admittcd to NATO and
also a candidate for accession to the European
Union, Hungary', although long considered b1,the
West as havrng the edge rn the race tou'ards inte-
gration rvith u'estern economic. polrtrcal and
securib' structures, has shown lrttle srgn, since
the fall of communism, of the economrc grouth
u,rdely, expected of it b1' the West The success
of the prograrnme for the reform of public
finance implemented b1' the present leftrst
government and the economlc hberahsatron that
rvas the legacv of its conservatlve predecessor
nevertheless augur lvell for a more prosperous
future Moreover, rn political terms thc country
ls set on a resolute course of democratic stability.
l l For decades, Hungary's relations rvith
most of rts nerghbours (Romania. Slovakia,
Yugoslavra) have been heavilr,, influenced by the
fact that some three mrllion Magy,ars live outside
the country The present government's policl'
consists of reconcrhatron of past drffcrences and
cooperation rvith other ccntral European coun-
tnes and thrs potentrally destabrhsrng factor
therefore seems to have been obvrated The
treatv of understanding. cooperation and good
neighbourliness signed u'ith Romanra (autumn
1996) is of the hrghest political significance rn
vreu'of the large Hungarian minontv rn Romanra
(ovcr I 6 milhon people) but also u'orthv of
attcntron rs the treaty u'rth Slovakia (home to
600 000 Hungarrans) These two agreements
have made a vital contrrbution to improving the
polrtrcal chmate rn central Europe.
12. Hungarl' made knorvn rts u'ish to join
NATO as earlv as 1994 and m the same 1'ear
jorned the Partnershrp for Peace prograrrrme. A
maJor programmc for restructunng the
Hungarran armv has also bcen set in tram: thrs1 Frankfttrter'-'lllgemetne Zettung, l0 Apnl 1997
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provides for equrpment replacement, assrmilation
of the new western doctrine and interoperabilitl'
bctween Hungartan and NATO forces by' the
1,'ear 2000
13 Hungarl' made an officral apphcation for
acccssion to thc European Unton in April 1994
It is not keen on the rdea put fonvard by France,
and lvhich Germany' supports, of thc Europcan
Unron organising a standrng conference of all
apphcant countries as it believcs this will delal'
its acccssion to thc Union
14 Hungary has been an assoctate partner of
Westcrn European Union srnce 1994.
(c) The Czech Republic
15 The Czech Republic came into being on I
January 1993 follorving the partition of
Czechoslovakra. Like Poland and Hungan' it
bclongs to the group of countries gcnerallv con-
srdered as berng in the first rvave of entrants to
NATO and the European Union The countr,r''s
economic succcss is matched by that of tts tran-
srtron to democracy, a proccss that occurred
raprdly and rvithout malor upsct The absence of
any differcnces ulth its nerghbours, in large
measure due to its extremelv homogenous popu-
latron and the fact that rts borders are vtrtually
unchallenged, rounds off an extremell' positrve
picture; the Czech leadership fccls its can thus
reahstrcally expect the country to become a
membcr of rvestern politrcal and economrc and
polrtico-mrlrtary rnstitutions wrthout creatmg
serious drffrculties for tts future alhes and
partners or ma1or oblectrons berng raised from
countrles that remain outstde such institutrons.
The srgnature of a reconciliatron agreement
betrveen Germany and the Czech Republic
deploring atrocities commrtted by' the Nazi
reglme and thc massive expulston of Sudetan
Germans at the end of the u'ar serves to rllustrate
the cordral relattons that now exist betrveen the
country and rts neighbours.
16 Wlth regard to the Czech Republic's
endeavours to reorganise its armed forces in
order to bnng them up to NATO requiremcnts,
progress has already been made tn achievmg
rnteroperabilitl, betu'een the Czech army and
Atlantrc Alliance forces. It is also rvorth noting
that the Czech Repubhc rs one of the fcw Euro-
pean countrtes reccntly to have mcreased tts
defcnce budget. As far as relattons rvith the
European Union are concemed, notc should be
taken of an agrecment signed on I January' 1995
rvhich provides for a progressrve lou'ering of
customs barriers
l7 The Czech Repubhc became an assoctate
partner country of Western European Union rn
r994
(d) Slovakia
18. Desprtc encouraging economic indlcators
for the last three 1'ears (grouth: 5-7%. falhng
inflation, stable unemplo.vment rate) and a satis-
factory rate of progress tou'ards a market ccon-
om)', Slovakia. u'hrch became rndcpcndent in
early 1993, faccs a thrcat to its plans to become
a membcr of three u'estern poltttco-securrtf insti-
tutrons (NATO, EU and WEU) bccause of the
image rt grves of a certain dcgree of polrtical
instabrlrty'. arlsmg mainly' from the long-standing
political feud betueen Prime Minister Vladrmir
Mecrar and Slovakran President Mrchal Kovac.
Slovakia's substantial Hungarian minontl'
(568 000 people. accordmg to Slovak sourccs,
livrng rn thc south of the country along the bor-
ders u'ith Hungarl') rs a further potentral sourcc
of rnstabrlrtl'. Dcspite thc agreement on good-
neighbourly relattons rvhrch Slovakra and
Hungary srgned rn 1995. Hungarians living rn
Slovakra are particularll' aggrievcd b1' thc adop-
tion of a lau on thc country"s officral languagc
recentl1, passcd b1' Parliament on the grounds
that the legrslation does not take sufficient
account of the languages of cthnic minorities To
complete this overvieu., reference should also be
made to the extremely good relations Slovakia
has alu'a1's marntained urth the Russtans. u'hich
occasronallv arouse cnttcism rn thc West.
l9 Horvever. havrng once clearly defincd its
oblectives, the Slovak leadership rs activell'' sct-
ting about convmcing the West that Slovakia
should be rncludcd m any enlargement of ucst-
ern instrtutions. At the same ttmc. internal mcas-
ures hal'e becn mtroduccd to brrng the countrv's
econom)', government and armed forces up to the
level of those of u.estern countrtes A referen-
dum on the country's loining the Atlantrc
Alliance is also schcduled for the end of May'
This urll be the first timc an associate partner
country has consulted its pcople drrectll' on thc
issue. In addrtron to its vtcu's on NATO acces-
sron, the Slovak pcople urll also be asked
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vuhether they' u'ould agree to havrng nuclear
\\'eapons or forergn troops on therr ternton'
20 In hrs address to the WEU Assembll, on 5
Decembcr 1996, the Slovak Prrme Mmrster rert-
erated hrs countn"s determinatron to pursue rts
effort to gain entrv to NATO and WEU. pointing
to the fact that the Slovak arml' had been reor-
ganised rvith thrs ln vle\\'. Hc also argued that rn
the intcrests of stabrlrtv in Europc as a rvhole.
NATO should conduct the ncgotrations on
cnlargcment in parallel mth those leadrng to an
agrecment urth the Russrans, so as to prevent the
latter from feeling margrnahsed. uhrch might
prescnt a danger to European sccuritv.
2l Slovakra signed an assocratron agreement
u'rth the European Union rn 1993 and apphed for
membership at thc European summrt meetmg m
Cannes in June 1995. The countrl has been an
associate partner rn WEU srnce 1994
(e) Slovenia
22 Slovenia has had the good fortune, and the
good sense, not to become involved rn the armed
conflict that accompanred thc break-up of former
Yugoslavra, Its geographrcal posrtron, relatrvell,
homogcnous ethnrc composltlon and, to an
cxtent. rts history account for rts havrng success-
full1' come through the troubled period of thc
rcvival of rts nationhood, democratrsatron of rts
politrcal s1'stcm and liberahsation of its cconom\.,
x'rthout cxpenencing anv srgruficant upheaval or
ma.;or sacnfice
23 It norv has to carve out a ne\\. niche for
itself xithrn the European securrtv sy'stem The
securrtv drmensron of Slovenra's forergn pohcv
hrnges on the countn'hal,ing a firm anchoragc m
u.estcm polrtrco-mrlrtan, mstrtutrons spccrficallv
NATO. the European Unron and WEU
Although Slovenra is not normallv rcgarded as
bclongrng to the first wave of chosen entrants,
support for rts candrdacv is gainrng ground,
especrallv in vicw of the fact that, accordrng to
Wcstern crrterra. lt ls a democratic country, on
good tcrms u'rth rts nerghbours 
- 
nou'adavs e,,,en
urth Italr' 
- 
and x'ell on the u,ay to being a free
market econom)', urth grouth at a satisfacton'
rate (1995 GDP + 48yo. inflatron. 128%,
unemplorment 14 5'/o). Slovenra's apphcation
to join the Europcan Unron can be vrerved in as
promlsrng a hght as lts accession to NATO rn
viov of the countn"s small srze. hrghlr,' indus-
triahsed nature and rvell-organiscd tertiary sector
and its determrnation to adlust to European
Unron standards Consequentlr,, its chances of
accedrng to the Europcan Unron in the foresee-
able future u'ould appear to be farrll' hrgh
Chronologrcalll' speakrng, Slovenia u'as the last
countrl' from central and eastern Europc to
bocome an assoclate partner of WEU and hopes
in due course to become a full membcr.
(fl The Baltic stotes
24. The securrt!' concerns of Estonia, Latvra
and Lrthuanla anse from their past histon' and
their proximrtv to a ven'large countrv whrch has
on a number of occasrons exercrsed domrnion
over the rvhole region Further factors for poten-
tral dcstabrhsatron are the srze of the thrce coun-
tries, the fact that their borders 
- 
rvhich Russra.
moreover, has not y,et recognrsed rn Estoma and
Latvia's case 
- 
are hard to defend and the nature
of therr populatrons rvhrch. in trvo Baltrc states.
include ver1, large Russran minonties The three
states are conscquently' seeking membership of
the three \\,estern polrtical or politrco-mrlitary
organisatrons rn order to safcguard their rnde-
pcndence rvhrch. although not drrectly under
threat at the momcnt, thcy feel cannot be
regarded as secure for all time
25 Accessron to the Atlantic Alliance rs
clearh'the marn oblcctrve bemg pursued by thc
Baltic states under thcir secuntv pohcl' It u.as
urth that in mind that they subscrrbed to the
Partnership for Peace rn 1994 NATO could
offer them, among other thrngs, a pohtico-mili-
tarl'guarantec backed b1'thc po\\'er of the Unrted
Statcs and 
- 
somethmg thel- are reluctant to
admrt 
- 
rts nuclear umbrella. Hon'ever, rt seems
unlikely they urll be admrtted to the Atlantic
Alhance. at least rn the first u,ave. m vien' of
strong opposrtion from Russra u'hrch is con-
stantlv pointrng to their geographic position and
the fact thcl' lvere formerll' part of the Soviet
Unron (something ths West does not acknorv-
ledge). The Russians make this argument an
issue of principle, thus lendrng a trnge of senti-
mcnt to the rhetonc thev employ against such an
eventualitv It rs clear. hou'ever. that the West
cannot remain lmpasslve to Baltic asprrations to
greater securitl', u'hatcver thc drfficulties of satrs-
f,'rng therr clarms m thrs rcspect For thrs reason
alternatrve proposals to drrcct NATO mcmber-
ship are contmuallv bcrng put fonvard Of these,
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one rather unusual suggestlon rs that the United
States mrght guarantee the Baltic states'
independence2.
26 The three Baltic countrres are also looking
to ioin the European Union - wrth u'hich they
signed association agreements in 1995 
- 
as
qurckly'as possrble, on both economlc and politi-
cal grounds. Most European observers are of the
vierv that from an economic point of vierv, the
entry of Estonia, Latvra and Lithuania could go
ahead urthout ma.;or difficulties as they are small
countrres rvhich do not have vast agricultural
sectors, but do have hrghly'educated populations.
Hou'ever it is essential that the1, rrd themselves of
the after-effects of their former economic dep-
endence on Russia as quickll'as possrble, u'hile
completing the economic reform programmes
they already have rvell in hand 
- 
especialll, in
Estonia and Latvra. Furthermore Russra rs not
nearly as set against their entr)' to thc European
Union as it is to their joining NATO. Hou'ever,
major rssues of border definrtron (particularll'the
delal' rn the srgnature of agreements delimiting
Russra's borders wrth Estonra and Latvra) and
the status of the largc Russian minontres m
Estorua and Latvra strll remain: rf these continue
unresolved untrl the trme those countnes accede,
thel' could soon become significant areas of
drspute betrveen the European Union and
Moscorv.
27 Estonia, Latvra and Lithuania have been
WEU assoclate partner countries since 1994 and
want to become full members as soon as poss-
ible. For reasons similar to those already
referred to in respect of the European Union,
Russian oppositron to this prospect should not
prove categoric By contrast, the WEU member
states' policy of admitting as full members onl1,
those countries that are members of both the
European Union and NATO means that the
Baltic states could not jorn WEU before being
admitted to NATO However, it must be
stressed that even if they cannot become fulI
members, upgradrng therr status in WEU rvould
consrderablv enhance the feeling of security of
these three small countries.
28. As for Poland, the presence in the Kalinrn-
grad enclavc of srzeable Russian military forces,
u'hich include nuclear weapons, creates a
secuntv problem for Lithuania ri,hich is exacer-
bated by the issue of Russran mrlrtary translt
through rts territory.
(g) Romania
29 A number of negatrve factors have for
some time stood rn the u'ay of Romarua's appli-
cation to join \4,estern polrtrcal and security instr-
tutrons 
- 
chrefly' NATO. These include the
country"s medrocre economic performance, the
overndmg rnfluence on polrtical life of the com-
munist old guard and brlateral drfficulties with
some of the countrl"s neighbours, particularly
over ethnic mlnont\' rssues.
30 However in recent months, encouraging
new developments seem to have rvrought consrd-
erable changes in thrs state of affarrs. The con-
clusion of a treaty with Hungary rn autumn
1996, the initralling of a treaty' rvith Lkrarne on 3
Mav 1997, the political changes that have taken
place internally whose effect, rnter alta, has been
to introduce a programme of acceleratcd eco-
nomic reform, the diplomatrc efforts deploy'ed b1'
the nerv leaders m Bucharest and support from
u'estern political circles rvhich havc tradrtionallv
been friendly tou'ards Romanra have given new
rmpetus to Romanra's candidacy
31. Hence France follorved by the United
Krngdom, Italy, Turkey' and Greece have all
openly supported Romanra's mclusion among
those chosen to form part of the first u'ave of
NATO accesslons. Prominent members of the
Unitcd States Congress have reportedlrJ come
out in favour of NATO taking such a decisron
Moreover Romania says it is rvrlhng to bear the
financial burden of its incorporation rn the
Atlantic Alhance, rts reasoning berng that rts
secunty costs would be far higher u'ere rt to
remain outsidea.
32 While it is true that Romanra's rmproved
chances of joining Euro-Atlantic structures is a
relativell' recent development, the country
nevertheless regrstered an mterest rn loinrng right
' WEU Instrtute for Secunty' Studies semlnar on sub-
regronal stabrlifi' rn central Europe rn view of EU
and NATO enlargement, l3-l.l February 1991.
a President Constantinescu addressing the NATO
Permanent Council on 4 Februarv 19972 Frankfurter Allgememe Zettung,28 February 1997.
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at the start of the post-communrst era. Thus
Romania has becn a member of the North
Atlantic Cooperatron Councrl smcc l99l and
rvas the first of the former Warsarv Pact mem-
bers to loin NATO's Partnershrp for Peacc
initiative (in Januarl' 1994) Moreover rn June
1995, it filed rts application tolom the European
Uruon, havrng signed an Assocratron Agreement
rvrth that organisation rn February 1993.
Romania is also an associate partner of Western
European Uruon
(h) Bulgaria
33 Of all thc applicant countries striving to
accede to thc West's polrtrcal and military
structures, Bulgarra rs no doubt the least hkelv to
be admitted in the first wave of enlargement.
While the main rcason for this assumption rs that
economic reform rn Bulgaria lags rvay, behind
that in other countrres, another factor is the
strong current of polrtrcal tensron m the countrl,
rvith the govemment apparently unable, for the
trme bemg, to gain control of the economv. In
addition, although rt rs true that accession to
NATO rs one of Bulgarra's forergn polio, oblec-
trves. it rs not as high on the hst of priorities as
membershrp of the European Unron, probably
because of Bulgarra's traditional tles wrth
Russra. recentlv renerved through cooperation
agreements srgned rn 1993 and 1995.
34. As things stand, Bulgaria's progress to
date can be descrrbed as mrxcd. The state of its
econom)' and rts polrtrcal climate belong rather
on the minus side of the equation but the country
has a more posrtrve record rvhen rt comes to its
relations rvith its neighbours (Grecce, Turkel',
FYROM, Serbia and Romanra) u'hrch arc cur-
rentll, good and the political chmate has been
improving steadill, smce the fall of conxnunlsm
In the particular case of Turker'. rt should be
noted that the dispute betu'een the trvo countrres
over the Bulganan authorities' attrtude torvards
the large Turkish and Pomak minonty hving in
the east of the countn' came to an end following
lifting of the restnctrve measures rmposed in the
latter vears of the Livkov regrme It is also
rvorth porntrng to the special nature of relations
rvrth FYROM rvhrch Bulgarra has recognised
even though it contmues to deny the existence of
a Macedonian natron and language, considering
the latter a dialect of Bulgarian.
35. The follorvrng can be mcntroned among the
reforms desrgned gradualll' to restructure the
countr), along Western lmes depolrtrcrsrng the
armed forces and the adoption of a programme to
modernise them, reorganrsing them rnto smaller,
more mobile units and the rvrthdrarval of a largc
number of military units from the countn,'s
Greek and Turkish borders.
36. Bulgarra jorned the Partnership for Peace
and the North Atlantic Councrl in 1991 and offi-
crally'announced that rt u'as seeking membership
of the European Unron m December 1995 and of
NATO rn February' 1997. It became a WEU
assocrate partncr rn 1994.
37. It remams to be seen to lvhat extent the
convincmg defeat of the ex-corrrmunist partv in
the recent electrons in Bulgaria and the formation
of a nerv government with a more Western-
onented outlook will specd up the necessar)'
reforms and alter the tradrtionalll, close tres
Bulgaria has until nou'had urth Russra
III. An important external factor
(o) Russia
38 The Russran Federation is undeniably of
maJor rmportance to Europe's stabilitv and equi-
hbrrum Its surface area. the size of its popula-
tron and lts huge mrlrtary and economic potential,
not to mentlon its hrstory, are factors urth a
decrsrVc rnfluence on the securitv balance in
Europe. The plan to enlarge NATO could even
be regarded as stemming drrectly. from the his-
toric developments that have taken place rn this
huge country 
- 
the erstrvhile core of the Sovret
Union 
- 
and the prospcct of rts making a dra-
matic return to the internatronal stage rn the not
too distant future.
39. No realistic analvsrs of the current securitv
situation in central and eastern Europe or senous
attempt at outlmmg the vanous scenanos of a
balance of forces m Europe rvould therefore be
complete rf it farled to take account of Russia's
geostrategrc influence or its leaders' attrtude to
the ncw realrtres that are taking shape. Admit-
tedly' Russra ls currentll, unable to prevent a
group of former allies of the Soviet Union 
- 
to
rvhrch rt consrders rtself rn large measure the suc-
cessor 
- 
from Jolrung the Atlantic Alliance, long
regarded as rts drest foe This can be explained
b1'the countr)"s loss of strategrc influence, eco-
10
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nomrc drffrculties. internal polrtrcs disruptcd b1,
factors of instabrlity bom of natronalrtv rssues
and the ambiguity surrounding some of the
mechamcs of a recently-established dcmocrao'.
combined, needless to say. wrth the cnsrs poten-
tiall1' loomrng in the uppermost ranks of rts lead-
ershrp However, there are few obscrvers rvho do
not subscribe to the vierv that although thrs
rnterim penod ma1, perhaps contmue for some
1'ears to come, a drffercnt rcalitl, r,rrll come to
prevarl rn the mcdrum term It is therefore in the
mterest of everyone 
- 
Europe, the West and the
rvorld at large 
- 
not to attempt to rgnore the fact
that Russra 1s a maJor factor for regronal balance
and. still more rmportant. not to seek to humihate
it, rvhrch could lcad to a hardemng of the political
srtuatron and possrbly the serzure of porver by
forces that rcgard the West and NATO as tradi-
tronal enemies and might respond bv formrng
neu, alliances hostrle to NATO. through the
creatron of new spheres of influence and b1'
mcreasing the countrl"s military potentral rn both
nuclear and conventional rveapons.
40 Political wrsdom and long-tcrm polrtrcal
mterests therefore dictate that the West should
handle Russran susceptrbilities and fears care-
fuIly. but u'rthout losrng srght of the fact that no-
one has an1' right to prevent those countries that
so rvrsh from appll'rng to jorn the European and
Euro-Atlantrc instrtutions and that no factor
external to NATO. the European Uruon or WEU
can be alloxcd to mfluence their decrsion to go
ahcad and enlarge. Nonetheless, a decisron has
strll to taken on horv to convince Russra that
enlargement. especralll, NATO enlargement. is
not drrected against rt, and a new European
secunty system must be defined in u'hrch Russra
can be accommodated and work in cooperatlon
rvrth an enlarged NATO. In a global secuntl,
sl,stem of this nature it xrlll be of paramount
importance not to give the impression that the
cold rvar "loser" is being isolated. This could
marnh, be achreved if in thc first instance an
agreement rvere concluded between NATO and
Russia makrng provision for close consultation
on maJor decrsions concernlng European secu-
ritl'. This frameu,ork agreement might be sup-
plemented by' further mcasures such as pro-
grammes for rncreased economic cooperatron, the
amendmcnt of certarn existing drsarmament
agrcements (such as thc CFE Treaty') to take
account of changes that hal'e taken place m the
balance of forces, a formal undertakrng by
NATO not to station nuclear weapons or forcrgn
troops on the terntones of the nerv alhes and.
lastll'. for NATO enlargement not to cxtend to
the territories of the formcr Sovret Unron (u'rth
the Baltrc states berng a specral casc) A neu'
instrtutronal and political frameu'ork of this tvpe
uould make the Russian Fcdcratron feel that. far
from berng excluded from the ncw svstcm. rt rvas
rather an integral part of it. As u'ell as improving
the chmate of relatrons both rnsrde the Federatron
and internatronalll', such a frameu'ork rvould
make it far more difficult for extremist or
nationahst clcmcnts to acccde to porler and
u'ould thus prccludc a development the West
uishes and rs able to avord. A polio'of thrs t-vpe
has rts mcnts cvcn though the spectre of Mr
Vladrmir Zhrrrnovsky comlng to pouer 
- 
inl'oked
by Mr Chernomyrdm recentlv on hrs rcturn from
Davos5 
- 
would not appear to be as rmmlnent as
some u'ould have us believe
(b) Ukraine
4I. Having achieved independent statehood rn
l99l after centuries of unron urth Russra.
Ukraine initially' appeared to vacillatc bctu,een
closer cooperatlon u'rth the West and the pro-
communrst tcndencres that seemingly held su'a1'
in particular rn the eastern part of the countrl-
The balance no\\' appcars to have suung the
other rval' and pro-Wcstcrn slmpathres seem to
have been rn the asccndant for some timc
Ukrame's tres rvrth Russra are characterised by'
economlc depcndencl' (all Ukraine's energv rs
supphed by rts neighbour to u,hom it is indebtcd
to thc tune of 4.2 brllion dollars), and bv the
prescnce of major bilateral problems (thc partr-
tron of the Black Sea Fleet or the fact of Cnmea
now being a Ukrainian possessron) u'hrch,
despite agrcements that have been srgned. and
implemented 
- 
albeit imperfecth' 
- 
contrnuc to
bear down heavily' upon thcir rclationshrp.
42. Now that rt has srgned a cooperatron
agreement rvrth the European Union, which not
all Unron member states have ratrficd as yet,
Ukraine, although not seeking full rntegratron
into Western structures, seems to be looking to
closer cooperatlon rvrth the West. It therefore
applicd for WEU assocrate partnership status (in
' The lrt"rraltonal Herald
t997
ll
Tnbune, 8-9 February
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summer 1996) and envlsages concludrng a coop-
eration agreement urth NATO. although rt
regards NATO accesslon as morc of a long-term
strategrc objective. Ukrame's Defence Mmrster
has said pubhcly that hrs countn' does not
oppose immediate NATO enlargement tou'ards
Ukrame's borders, provlded no nuclear weapons
are stationed on ne\\' members' territones6. It rs
rvorth notrng besrdes that, according to the
Ukramian Forergn Affarrs Minrster, Ukraine
rvould prefer rts links rvrth the West to be
through WEU rather than NATO. Should this
indeed prove to be the case, it would be up to
WEU to take the rnrtratrve rn developing such
relatrons Hou'cver, at a meetmg in Brussels
with the NATO Secretan,-Gencral rn March, the
Ukrainian Forergn Mmrster confirmed that hrs
countn"s strateglc oblective for the longer term
rvas membership of a transformed NATO.
(c) Belarus
43. Belarus is. to all intents and purposes, the
European countn, of the CIS uhrch rs closest to
Russia, and even to the former Sovret Union 
- 
an
observatron based on criteria of a lingurstic
(Russran has been reinstated as one of the coun-
try,'s officral languages), economic (economic
mtegratron u'ith the Russian Federation rvas
approved rn a referendum held in May 1995) and
polrtrcal (the Head of State has very extensrve
po\\'ers and rvide mfluence over parliamentar)'
electrons 
- 
Parhament, rvhich has limited po\\'ers,
rvas drssolved because it drsagreed rvith the
Presrdent's plans for the countn''s future), not to
mentron syrnbohc nature (the old soviet emblems
rvere rerntroduced rn 1995). On 2 Aprll 1996,
Russia and Belarus concluded an agrccment 
-
ratified rn the meantime b1' both countries 
-
provrding for the creation of a Uruon of sovcrergn
republics and rn Januan' 1997 the Russran
President put a proposal to Presrdent Lukashenko
for reunification of the tu'o countnes, provrded
Belarus approved thrs step m a referendum.
44 Relatrons rvrth the West are naturally
affccted b1' the ever-lncreasrng influence of its
Russran neighbour Belarus has demanded the
creatlon of a dcnuclearrsed zone in central and
eastern Europe. a proposal the NATO Secretary-
General has relected, u'hile making clear none-
theless that NATO has no intentron of deploy'rng
nuclear weapons on new mcmbcrs' tcrrrtorresT,
45. In April 1996. Belarus concluded varrous
agreements with the European Uruon. Hou'ever,
because the countrl' has fallen ri'a1' behrnd rvrth
the reform of its economv, rvhose performance
can hardll' be deemed satisfactorl' (ten 1'ears of
negative growth), and because of rts dependence
on Russra, there has been little Wcstem rnvest-
ment there.
IV Enlargement of western
p o lit ico- mi lit ar y in stit u tio ns
(a) NATO
46. The norv evident mtention of the Atlantic
Alliance to proceed rvith NATO enlargement in
the near future coincrdes rvrth apphcations from
several former Warsaw Pact countrres to be
rncorporated, if possrble rmmedrately, in Euro-
Atlantic structures. The arm of these former
Soviet Union alhes rs both to strengthen their
own security' and 
- 
their maln mtentlon ln some
cases 
- 
to rdentifi' themselves ever more closely
w'rth thc West and reaffrrm their ties rvrth it and
to disengage themsclves from Russia's sphere of
influence. Hence, paradoxicalll', some future
partncrs uhosc sccunty does not appear to be
under threat in the short or medium term, are
sa),lng thev arc ready to make a concerted effort
and the sacnfices that are necessar)' in order to
secure Atlantrc Alliance membership. It is lvorth
mentionrng at thrs luncturc that accordrng to
Amencan estimates, the cost of Atlantic Alhance
enlargement, rf only three countries join, rvould
be some 38 billion dollars, l5o/o of u'hrch rvould
be provrded b1'the nerv members. Herem. to an
extent, lies also the key' to another paradox.
namely the fact that the West rs saf ing. unoffr-
crally but clearll', that rt rs prepared. at lcast in
the initial stages, to accept precrsely those apph-
cants that have least reason to feel threatened. In
central and south eastern Europe, NATO now
scems more hke a polrtico-securitl' organisation
of stable democratic countries than an alliance rn
the traditronal sense.
47 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,
rvhich, as dcmocratrcally govemed, politically
t2
6 W'all Street Journal, l7 Januarv 1997 -lgence France Presse,30 January 1997
DOCUMENT I565
stable market economres not involved rn border
drsputes, are generalll' reckoned to be the first
that $1ll be rnvrtcd to lorn the Alliance, arc not
alone m askrng to bc assrmrlated rnto the politico-
secuntl, svstems of thc West. Apphcants that
feel thel' ma)' come under pressure, such as the
three Baltic countries. or u'hose economies are
not full1'liberahsed, such as Bulgaria, Romarua
and up to a certam point, Slovenia, are also
hoprng to be accepted Horvever tt is most
unhkely that NATO urll be able to assimilate all
of these countnes rn one go 
- 
especlally if rt flies
rn the face of the rvishes and security needs of
other states hke Russia and Ukraine - wrthout
disruptrng the securitl' balance rn Europe and
consequentlv endangenng prospects for fruitful
cooperation and mutual confidence in tomor-
rorv's Europe
48. The nerv Amencan Sccretary of Statc, Mrs
Albrrght, in a senes of statements released to the
prcss before she embarkcd on a tour of thc major
Europcan capitals (end February 1997), reaf-
firmed the Unrted States' determrnation to
expand NATO, defined thc pnncipal stages in the
decrsron-maklng process and outlined the coursc
of future relationshrps u'rth countries that would
not be admittedE She stated rn this connectton
that the list of neu, NATO members rvould be
draun up at the NATO summit meeting to be
held in Madnd in Ju11'. that accession negotia-
tions for those countrres should be concluded in
trme for the December meeting of the Atlantic
Council and that ratrfication of the treaty of
accessron b1' parliaments must bc completed in
trme for the countnes chosen to jorn NATO in
1999, on the occasron ofthe 50th anntvcrsary of
the Washrngton Trcatl'. Addressrng an extraor-
drnary mecting of the North Atlantic Council,
Mrs Albrrght made clear that the Unrted States
envrsagcd the creatton of a NATO-Russia
Council rvrthin the frameu'ork of the agrecmcnt
the Alhance rvas to conclude with the Russtans,
its purpose berng to promote regular dialogue on
the mam secuntf issues, to take collcctive decr-
sions u'herevcr posstble and to carry out jolnt
actions. The presence of Russtan planners rvrthin
the Alliance's main mrlrtary commands would
also be advocated. To complete the new coop-
eration arrangements, a NATO-Russia brigade
'The Ecoronlsl. 15 February,
Le ]Ionde,l6 February 1997
would be crcated Further proposals from the
Srxteen on updatrng the CFE Treatl' rn hne rvith
Russra's u'rshcs (large reductrons rn NATO
forces, abandonrng the concept of blocs and
spheres of rnfluence, settlng limrts on the quantrtl'
of u'eapons held b1' each tndtvtdual country)
rvould also contnbute to a general improvement
in the climate Amenca's determinatron to con-
clude a NATO-Ukrarne secunty agreement
before the Madrid summrt u'as reaffirmed at the
meeting of the North Atlantrc Councrl. held in
Brussels on 18 February.
49. As there rs no question of all the applicant
countrres jorning NATO togcthcr, negotiations
wrth those not admitted rn the first rvave rvtll
continue Moreover, the creatton of a nerv
Atlantic Partnershrp Council 
- 
also envisaged for
Madrrd 
- 
as the loint agency of a merged Part-
nershrp for Peace and North Atlantrc Coopera-
tron Councrl rvould ensure that all countries that
so u'rshed had a presencc tn a Euro-Atlantrc
forum enabhng them to entcr rnto dialogue with
the Alhancee
50 The rnrtral Russian reactton to this plan for
the future securrtv of Europe has been farrly'
encouraging, the more so as Mrs Albright has
been careful to stress that the Atlantrc Alliance
has no mtentron of deplovrng nuclear arms on the
terntorres of the new members President
Yeltsrn, having reaffrrmed Russia's opposition in
principle to the plan for enlargement, satd he rvas
optimistic about the chances of reaching agree-
ment at a meeting uith hrs American counterpart
due to take place rn Helsinkr on 20 and 2l
March. Thc outcome of the talks seems to justilu
at least a degrec of cautrous optimrsm Desprte
persrstent drffercnces of oprnion over the pros-
pect of NATO enlargement, a scrics of agrce-
mcnts on rmportant rssues has emcrgcd. Thus a
broad outhne cxtsts for a chartcr governlng
relatrons betu-een NATO and Russia. agrcomcnt
has bccn reached on rcnegotiattng thc CFE
Treat!, the princrple of a future SALT III
agreement has been accepted as u'ell as Russta's
mcreased involvement in G7 meetings and thc
need for economlc aid to Russra has been recog-
nised.
51. It remains to be seen rvhether the security'
s)'stem envrsaged above urll be acceptable to
13
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countrles that urll verv hkcly not form part ofthe
first or even the second u'ave of enlargement 
-
rvhich u'ould appear to be the case of the Baltrc
states 
- 
but *hrch nevertheless appear to feel
thel'need a sccunty, umbrella Imaginatrve solu-
trons must bc found as rcqurred in order to avoid
grev arcas and secuntv vacuums ansmg betrveen
NATO and its maJor partners to the east. such as
Russra and Ukrame It is therefore legitimate to
rarse the queshon of horv far WEU might be able
to play'a stabrhsing role m this connection 
- 
one
complementan'. no doubt, to the new Atlantic
Partnershrp Council. but no less essentral.
52 In thrs context rt is also rvorth studl,mg an
interestrng proposal put fom'ard by Guillaume
Parmentrer in an artrcle entrtled "Other ways of
enlargrng NATO"'o in *hich he advocatcs that,
at Madnd, NATO should take a decrsion to
embark on negotratlons rvith oll the candrdates
for accessron ln pursuance of Artrclc 10 of thc
Washrngton Treatv The pacc of these negotia-
trons u'rth each indivrdual country u'ould be
determrned b.v pohtrcal. geographrc. military',
financial and other consrderations According to
thrs proposal. nex' mcmbers w'ould jorn the
Alhance on a case-br-case basis as a result of a
process rr,hose effect u'ould be to ensure that
each accessron implied that countries strll in the
queue rvould have a further chance ofjoining and
not that thev rvere being relegated to an inferior
categorl' of states.
(b) The European Union
53 The ten central European countries u'ish-
ing to loin NATO are at the same time applicants
for acccssion to the European Uruon Their
desrre to bclong to a uruted Europe and their rea-
sons for appll'rng to Joln - are understandable rn
terms of therr hrstorl'. culture, democratrc mstr-
tutrons and the fact that, geographicalh' spcak-
rng. thel' form part of the same contrnent as the
longer-standmg Uruon membcrs. Moreover, thev
feel that therr entrl,to Europe u,ill allorv them in
the longer term to modernrse their economies,
notrvrthstanding the sacrifices that rvrll inrtiallv
prove necessary. and that membership will not
only'help them consolidate their fledgling democ-
t') See "Elargtr I'OT-4j' autrenrent" in Le lvIonde,22
March 1997
racies but urll also have the effect of improving
therr secuntv posrtron
54 It is rvorth pornting out that although rt is
gcneralll, acccptcd that a unrted Europe r,rrll. in
thc longer term. have a srgnificant common for-
ergn and securrtv poho'dimensron. the principlc
of which is lard doun in the Maastricht Treaty..
the size and shapc of that part of Europe's
structure are for the present undefined. The
mtergovernmental conference has the responsr-
bilitv of decrdmg, tnter alta, rvhat wrll be the
future of the European Uruon in securitl, terms.
Various scenarios mrght be envisaged: among
them the transformatron of the Union into an
alliance seems perhaps the least likely rn the
short or even the medrum tcrm, in vier.l' of the
fact that there are several neutral countries
among rts membership and glven the hnks
betrveen NATO and WEU and American reJec-
tion of the perceptron of the Unitcd States as
automatrcallr', rf rndrrectll', hnked to thc defence
of European countrrcs u'hrch are not mcmbers of
the Atlantrc Alhance Nevertheless, it rs strll
rvidelv consrdered that the European Union, both
as a result of the express rvishes of its member
states and through force of crrcumstances, will 
-
gradualll' perhaps. but resolutell' 
- 
develop its
secunty and defence drmension by' drawing per-
ceptrblv closer to Western European Union,
although the goal of a merger of the two institu-
tions strll seems a long rvay' ahead.
55. While the summrt meeting NATO is to
hold in July' 1997 represents the chief milestone
in the decrsron-makrng process as regards the
neu' members of the Atlantic Alliance and the
form and content of the latter's relatronshrps rvith
other u'ould-be members and major partncrs to
the east such as Russia and Ukraine, rn thc case
of the Europcan Uruon thc fundamcntal decisions
rn relatron to Uruon enlargement u'rll naturally be
taken b1, the intergovernmcntal conference
Nevertheless lt seems to be accepted generally
that negotratrons betrveen the EU and the neu,
applicant countries urll begin six months after
the close of the IGC and that they wrll be
'judged" on a case-b)-case basis, that is to say,
on the basrs ofan objectrve assessment ofeach of
their posrtrons. Moreover, from the expenence of
earher enlargements it would appear that the first
accesslons urll not take placc untrl after the 1,ear2000 Thus the Polish Mmrster for Foreign
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Affarrs acknou'ledged. rn response to observa-
tions from u-estern drplomats and from thc
conunlssloner rcsponsrble for enlargement to the
effect that the 1'ear 2000 rvas an unrealistic
deadhne 
- 
even for the first round ofaccessions 
-
that he u'ould prefer hrs countn' to jorn in 2001
under more fal'ourable terms than in 2000 under
terms that rvere less so"
56. Enlargement of the trvo organisations rvill
therefore proceed at a different pace, notu'ith-
standing the hoped-for parallehsm betueen the
two processes. and the fact that the three most
favoured candidates (Poland, Hungary', Czech
Repubhc) seem to be the same in both cases. In
parhcular, the start of the NATO and European
Union negotiatrons rvrll be out of step. as rvrll
therr duratron and possibll, also the final out-
comc, ln other x'ords. nen' membcrs' respectlve
entnes into the rnstrtutrons. In other rvords. the
possrbrlrty nou' looms of another trmetable slip-
page. perhaps a morc senous one, namell' that
for the countrres. other than the three favouritcs,
invrtcd to lorn both these major rnstitutrons The
ncrv Amencan Secretary' of State has alreadl'
announced that she rs rn favour of the European
Union acceptmg apphcatrons from the three
Baltic states, to offset rn part the fact that they
u'rll not be;ornrng NATOl2 Moreover, the pres-
ence among the ten applicants of a number of
countrres rvhose size, structure and state of eco-
nomic advancement should facilitate therr entry
into communitl' rnstitutions but u,hrch are never-
theless not regarded as pnme candidates for
NATO entn,(Slovakra, Slovenia) raises the pos-
srbrlrtl' of such countries being accepted in prrn-
crple bv the European Union alone or. at any' rate
of therr apphcatrons berng likcll, to be accepted
far earlier than therr apphcation to lom NATO.
The reverse rs true of countncs such as Romania,
u'hosc apphcation to jorn NATO has latterly
been gathcnng strength owlng to political and
strategrc consrdcratrons, u'hile the countrl"s
possible entry to the European Uruon seems, at
least for the trme being, to have become substan-
tially more complicated orving to criteria relating
to the effectiveness and structure of its economv.
tt Internattonal Heralcl Tnbune.23 Jaruary 1997.
t? Le ltlonde. l6 Februarv 1997.
57 To redrcss the balance rn such cases.
France rcccntll'I3 made a suggestron. that u,on a
large measure of approval from the 15 EU gov-
ernments, for the crcatlon of a "European stand-
mg conference" bnngrng all the apphcant coun-
tnes around the table. rrrespcctrvc of the status of
their accession negotratrons
(c) t(EU
58. The enlargement of both NATO and the
European Unron u'ill not onlv radically alter the
secunty situation in Europe by' boostrng the nerv
members' confidence and opening up new eco-
nomic prospects for them but will also neces-
sarily lead to a thrrd enlargement 
- 
that of WEU.
59. Western European Union. itself in the
process of ma;or reorganisatron, and endeavour-
ing, especialh' since the NATO Council meeting
rn Berlin, to play' a prvotal role betrvccn thc
Atlantic Alliance and the European Unron, wrll
thus have a further challenge to face 
- 
that of
admitting and assrmrlatrng nerv mcmbcr states,
and at the same time developlng ne\\' dimcnsions
to its relatronshrps rvrth other European countries
that do not xrsh to becomc WEU members, such
as Russia and Ukrarne. and rvith those countries
u.hich, despite therr keenncss to become members
of the only exrsting European secunty organisa-
tion, rvill not be mvrted to do so.
60 The countries applf ing to WEU and the
European Union are, of course, WEU assocrate
partners rnvolved in the u'orkmg of its instrtu-
trons at various levels. all of u'hom rvant to
become fuIl members of the Organisation Fur-
thcrmore, although a degree of confusion still
rclgns over Russran pohcl'. rt rs clcar that the
prospect of WEU cnlargement is vicu'cd b1'
Russia urth far less susplclon than that of
NATO Consequentlr'. rn WEU's case. the pro-
cess of the acceptancc and assimtlatton of new
mcmbers should not run up against either the
same polrtical obstacles as enlargement of the
Atlantic Alhance or the complex economic and
institutronal drfficulties inevrtablv assocrated
u'ith European Unron enlargement. Holvever,
WEU rvill be obhged, b1' force of circumstances,
to find answers to a set of problems of an enttrely
different order. A number of issues arise: rvhich
countries rvill be involved rn this third enlarge-
15
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ment) What crrterra rvrll appll') What rvill bc
the relatronshrp urth those WEU assoclatc
partners askrng to become full membcrs but
u'hrch u'rll not bc rnvrted to do so (namelr,, thc
Baltrc states or Bulgarra)') What can be done,
rcahstrcallv. to help lmprovc therr sccuritv srtua-
tron. u'hrle remarning u'rthm the framervork of thc
treatres') All these questrons are obvious. In-
depth anall'srs of the present posltlon, an lmagl-
natrve approach to futurc developments and
malor polrtrcal decisrons urll all be necessary in
order to answer them. Your Rapporteur lavs no
clarm to maglc solutrons 
- 
there are none. Horv-
ever there rs no denyng that the existrng opfions
and vanous scenarlos are fairly'clear
61. Under one possrblc scenano, Western
European Unron u'ould contrnue to appll' stnctly
thc prrncrple of requrnng rts members to belong
to both thc European Unron and to NATO. Such
an optlon. rf not accompanred bv measures to
strengthen thc secuntv of countrics not rnvrted to
1orn, could margrnahse a group of European
states prcpared to make an activc contnbution to
burldrng a corrrmon European defence (Romania,
for example. or Bulgana) or that feel, rrghtll' or
u'ronglr'. most rn nced of one (such as the Baltrc
states)
62. Furthermorc. a scenarlo that enusages
accesslon to Western European Uruon by' coun-
tnes that are not NATO members, rvhich rs farrly
unrealistic for reasons external and intemal to
WEU 
- 
for example its rejection in the first
instance by'the Amencans u,ho rvould interpret lt
as an rndrrect commitment by virtue of Article 5
of the Washington Treatl', or, in the sccond. the
agrcement of all the mcmber states to guarantee
the securrtl' of certaln European countries
u'rthout Amerrcan aid 
- 
commands lrttle support.
63 Thrrdlr'. thc possrbrlrtv of granting full
membershrp to nerv NATO alhes, that, for varr-
ous reasons, do not accede to thc European
Unron does not seem rcahstic. Indeed, some
members uould regard such a decisron as belng
rncompatible urth thc sprnt of Maastricht.
Furthermore, such a solulon could not be enter-
tarned politrcally for as long as Turkcy, an ally of
NATO of verl' long standing axd an associate
member of Westem European Union, is not
rnvited to 1om.
64 The above brief analysrs consequently'
leads to the conclusion that one cannot strav too
far from the polrtrcal oblectrve of obtaining the
closcst possrble overlap between NATO, Euro-
pean Unron and WEU membership Howcvcr. rt
seems hrghlv hkch' that new factors ansrng ln
ccntral Europe such as thc drfference m the
trmescales for the accession of new members to
NATO and the European Uruon and the probable
non-accesslon to the Atlantic Alliance of coun-
tries that feel themselves to be potentiallv under
threat, can no longer be contamed in the tradi-
tronal vrerv of events to rvhrch we have long
gro\\n accustomed.
65 The above politrcal objective should in
vour Rapporteur's vreu' be the subject of a
flexrble approach that allorvs Western European
Unron room for imaginatron lvhen taking political
inrtratrves and enables rt to adopt substantivc
mrlrtar-l' cooperatlon measures (cooperation ovcr
trarnrng and armaments production, organising
.;ornt mrssrons or harmonisrng dcfence doctnnes,
for example) therebl' rmprovrng the secunt)'
srtuatlon rn central Europe rvhile strengthenmg rts
prescncc and rarsmg rts political profile rn the
regron 
- 
somethmg also hkel1, to prove necessary
outsrde the sphere of Atlantic Alliance actron
WEU's European role. the development of our
contment's institutrons, eastern European
resolve. the present balance of forces and its
polrtrcal acceptabili[' to non-partner countries all
contnbute to makrng this possible Here is a
challenge that WEU must mect imaginativelv,
rvith flexrbrlrtv and reahsm.
66 Rcference should be made at thrs pornt to
the important contnbutron to the colloquy made
bv Ambassador Cahen. former WEU Secrctary-
Gencral and author of the doctnnc bearing hrs
name. s'hrch holds that for a country'to become a
member of WEU it should first be a member of
both thc EU and NATO The new srtuatron that
\vas emerglng m eastern Europe promptcd hrm to
make thc follourng comments'
"To become a member of WEU it rvas
and. I believe, still is necessary to be a
member of the European Union and also
be a serious applicant able to meet the
requlrements for membership; it rvas also
necessar)'to belong to NATO.
That means that an)' state rvhich becomes
a member of NATO and the European
Union or is a serlous apphcant, meetmg
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the conditions for accesslon to the Euro-
pean Unron, rs entrtled to become a full
member of WEU I believe that manl' of
the current states appll'rng for membershrp
of the European Unron and NATO meet
those conditrons.
Many qucstions thcn arise m thrs context:
for instance. do I'ou have instantly to be a
member of the Alhance to become a mem-
ber of the European Union or rs it suffi-
cient, if you are apply'rng for NATO mem-
bership, to be a member of a reinforced
Partnershrp for Peace? I rvould be inchned
to thrnk that any apphcant who belongs to
a remforced Partnershrp for Peace and is a
member of the European Union is also
entrtled to full membership of our Organr-
sation."
67. Ambassador Cahcn rvas also in favour of
strengthenrng ties between WEU and countrres
rvhich do not fulfil all the cntena and rvhich at
present have observer, assoclate member or
assocrate partncr status
V. Additional security factors
(a) Regional cooperation
68. The eastward enlargement of the rvestern
secunty organisatrons 
- 
NATO and WEU 
- 
rn
the coming vears, rvrll create a tu,ofold division
withrn the regron in terms of countnes' securiry'
status. A first dividing line alread."- exists
between states u,antrng to jorn NATO and WEU
and states that have not asked for full integration
rvith those organisatrons 
- 
Albania. Belarus,
Bosnia, Croatia, FYROM, Moldova, Russra and
Ukraine. After the first lvave of assimilatron of
some of the apphcants mto NATO in 1999, a
second dividing line threatens to open up betrn'een
those central and eastern European states that
have joined NATO and those that have not.
69 Regional cooperation measures, by provrd-
rng the central and eastern European states u'ith
yet another security instrument, can help palliate
the fact that they lack an Alliance guarantee
Inrtratives alrcady taken by Poland and the
Scandinavian countries are a good example of
this
70. Poland, rvhrch can farrly be regarded as
being on the verge of NATO membershrp, rs pur-
suing an actrve pohcy rvith a view to makrng
Lrthuarua, Ukrarne and. to a lesser extent, Russra
part ofthe European secuntv area- as illustrated
b1, the creatlon of lornt Polish-Lrthuanian and
Polish-llkrainian peacekceping battalions. the
setting-up of a free trade area wrth the Baltrc
states in Apnl 1996, and the signature of a major
trade agreement with Russia in September 1996.
7l Denmark. Frnland. Nonval' and Srveden
for their part have an equally committed pohc1,
approach to the assimilatron of the Baltic states
and Poland into Europe. The)' rvere the prime
movers in the creatron of the Baltic peacekeeping
battahon (BALTBAT) 
- 
a multinational unit
rvhich bnngs together Estonran, Latvran and
Lithuanran forces and is supported bv the West.
Srnce 1992. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have
been cooperating acttvely with Estonia, Latvta,
Lithuania, Poland and Russra wrthrn the Council
of Baltic Sca States Several bilateral agree-
ments 
- 
mamly concernlng jornt mrlitary exer-
crses, Baltic troops' participation rn peacekeep-
ing forces in Bosnia and rnformatron exchange 
-
have either been srgned or are in the process of
being signed The important role play'ed by the
Baltic Assembly to promote cooperation and
regional stabrlrtl' should also be mentioned m thts
connectron.
(b) The OSCE and the role
of the neutral countries
72. Even rf the trrple enlargement of the major
rvestern polrtico-mrlrtarv organisations. together
wrth cooperation agreements rvrth Russta and
IJkrarne, meant simultaneous accesslon by all
applicant countries to NATO, the EU and WEU
(whrch hardll, seems likelr'), thc nerv sccunty
sy'stem thus formed in Europe rvould obviously
strll leave a number of countries on the srdelines
namely', those generallv rcgarded as potentrally
unstable because of therr domestic srtuation (hke
Albania or Belarus) and those rvhose securrtv,
specrficallv because of therr geopolitical posttton.
is harder to guarantee (Albanra agarn or the suc-
cessor states to former Yugoslavra) In thrs
sense, the neu' partnershrp arrangemcnts envis-
aged by'the Americans as partial compensation
for states not mvited to jorn NATO represent a
step in the right drrection, but are not cnough to
reassurc the countnes concerned.
73. The Organisation for Securrty and Coop-
eration m Europe. rvhich brings together virtually'
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all European countnes and those rn the Asran
part of the former Sovret Uruon. is a trred and
tested forum of consultatron. It has. tnter alta. a
conflrct-prevention mechanrsm and a procedure
for achrevmg conflict settlement and seems to
havc both the prestige and expenence necessan'
to plal' an lmportant part rn Europe in the fore-
seeable future Support for such an assertlon ls
to be found rn Mr Gonzalez's rccent spectacu-
larlv succcssful mlsslon to Serbra and Mr
Vranitzkr's hkeu,ise most rmportant usrt to
Albania It u'ould be logical therefore to cxpect
the OSCE to plal' a major role in the neu, era
Europe is about to cnter.
74 Frnalh'. the neu' sccuriry' map of Europe
rvould bc rncomplete if the stabrhsrng role the
neutral countnes can plal' rn the context of the
new balance that rs currentlv emerging u ere to be
drscounted. Wrth a tradition of several decades
behrnd them and no\\'on good neighbourlv, even
friendlr,, terms u'ith countrrcs once regarded as
encmles, armed urth consrderablc drplomatrc
cxpcnence and boastrng pubhc figures of rntcr-
nattonal reno\\rr, the non-ahgned countries of
Europe sccmcd destincd to plav an active part.
Thrs is precrsely hox' the Forergn Mrnisters of
Finland and Srveden in an artrclc pubhshed rn
carlv sprmgra entrtlcd Worhng for European
searrty outstde the NATO stntchtre descrrbed
the rolc thel' envisagcd for the ncutral countries
of Europc Thel' threu' rn a further rveightv con-
srderation -- regronal cooperatlon 
- 
gotng so far
as to idontrfl, the Baltic Sea regron as an area of
critrcal lmportancc for Europe's stability
W. Conclusions
75 Predictrng thc future is invarrabll, a riskv
busrncss Neverthelcss. at the time of rvrrting, the
broad outhnes of an agreemcnt bctu'een NATO
and Russra are emerging, u,hile thc x'ave of hb-
eral reforms seems to have rvell and trulv rvon
over the apphcant countrres to the polrtico-mih-
tary rnstitutrons of the West The same liberal
outlook secms at last to have gaincd a hold rn the
Russian Federation It mrght thercfore be logrcal
to deducc from this that enlargement of NATO,
the Europcan Union and WEU stands a good
chance of berng achreved rvithout causmg major
upheavals rn internatronal relations. Yet such
cnlargements, envrsaged in stages. and supple-
mented bv NATO agreements urth Russra and
the Ukrarne, together u'rth the creation of a
stronger partnershrp urth NATO conccrved bl'
the Amerrcans as a trade-off to countrres left out
rvhen the three malor instrtutions expand, cannot
provrdc the uhole of Europe rvrth secunty guar-
antees.
76 The OSCE. the non-aligned countries and
regronal cooperatron entered mto at the inrtiative
of states rvrth the nccessan' political *rll or
commitment to the task, rvrll plal' an essential
part m creatmg and maintalnrng a climatc of
confidence, cooperatlon and stabrlrtv ln tomor-
rorv's Europe. Westem European Unron. for rts
part, faccs a number of challenges' restructunng
and developlng rts operatronal capabrlrtrcs; de-
finrng its pivotal role betu'een NATO and the
European Union, the need to open rts door to
other member countrres and adjust to drfferent
forms of cooperatlon uith rts nerv partncrs to the
east There is an ovenvhelmrng requircment for
flcxibrlrtl- and an rmagmative approach to these
nes' realrties In this respect thc burden of
responsibrlrtl' placed upon WEU is a heaw, one
but the chances of success are real rf rve are
prepared to make the nccessary effort. Your
Rapporteur feels that one must not lose sight of
thc fact that WEU rs made up of countries rvhosc
tres rvith Europe are not lust a matter of polrtrcal
urll but of history'. culture and geography,,
factors u'hrch. bv definrtron thev could not
change. evcn if they n'ere mmded so to do
77. It tvas upon this constructive, not to say
optimistrc, note that thc Assembly,'s colloquv in
Athens drcw to a close. Several important
aspects of the drscussion: the need for the West
not to mrslead rts eastern neighbours and to be
mrndful of the drgnrtl,and thc legrtrmatc concerns
of the Russran people and the prospects of WEU
strengthening cooperation u'ith those of the pres-
ent associate partners that are not to bccome full
members. havc also been included rn the prescnt
report. It goes u'ithout sayng that thc Assembly.,
uhrch is pnvrleged to u,elcome ln its mrdst
emrnent representatives from central and eastern
European countrres and to benefit from their
active mvolvcment in its work, should contrnue to
monrtor closell' del'elopments in relation to the
vast area for discussron the enlargement of
European institutrons represcnts, on lvhrch the
future of Europe and u'orld peace u'ill largell'
depend
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